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Martin L. Wade [Argued]
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__________
OPINION*
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Gary Segraves filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking a new
trial on his convictions for numerous sexual offenses arising from the rape of his stepdaughter, B.H. Though Segraves’ petition advanced multiple grounds for relief—
including the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel—the District Court rejected each.
On appeal, Segraves challenges only the denial of habeas relief on his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. We will affirm.
We need not labor over the facts and instead refer the reader to the District Court’s
able description of the record in its opinion.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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The District Court’s holding is correct. To obtain a writ of habeas corpus,
Segraves needed to establish the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s adjudication of his
ineffective assistance claim either: (1) resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved the
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011).
Segraves contends, but has failed to prove, that the heightened scrutiny standard
and rule of per se prejudice for which he advocates have been clearly established by the
Supreme Court as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. To
support his argument, Segraves cites an assortment of non-binding, and readily
distinguishable, decisions from other circuit, district, and state courts. Given the plain text
of § 2254(d), however, these decisions cannot qualify as “clearly established” Federal
law. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s failure to apply this heightened scrutiny standard
was thus not unreasonable, as “it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been
squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
122 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor are we convinced by the record that the Superior Court’s application of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or its Pennsylvania law analogue, was
objectively unreasonable. With respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a state
court’s decision is objectively unreasonable only when the decision, “evaluated
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objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified
under Strickland.” Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). As our review of
the Superior Court’s determination is doubly deferential, see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540
U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003), to establish the Superior Court’s prejudice analysis was objectively
unreasonable Segraves had to clear a high hurdle. Segraves has failed to do so.
In its opinion, the Superior Court provided several reasons as to why Segraves’
counsel’s failure to call M.M. did not result in prejudice, which, when taken together,
establish the Superior Court’s prejudice determination is reasonably justified under
Strickland. Com. v. Segraves, No. 181 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 617167, at *4 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Feb. 16, 2016). The first being the “compelling evidence” of Segraves’ guilt, which
was established by B.H.’s testimony. Id. The Superior Court also noted that B.H.’s
testimony was corroborated by Dr. Kathleen Lewis, who “testified that she examined
B.H. in February 2008, when B.H. was thirteen years old, and observed that she had
sustained a significant vaginal injury consistent with someone having penetrating
intercourse with her.” Id.
Additionally, the Superior Court explained that Segraves was not prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to call M.M. because M.M.’s testimony would have been used solely to
impeach B.H.’s credibility and Segraves’ attorney “acknowledged that he used other
means of impeaching B.H.’s credibility, by presenting evidence of her motive for
fabricating the allegations and pointing out inconsistencies in her testimony.” Id. at *5.
The Superior Court also found that even though Segraves’ attorney failed to call M.M.,
“he did point out to the jury during closing argument that M.M. had never testified in
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support of B.H.” Id. The Superior Court further recognized that the trial court gave the
jury a failure to make a prompt complaint charge, which instructed the jury to consider
the delay in B.H.’s reporting her abuse in evaluating the reliability of her testimony. Id.
Based on these facts, the Superior Court concluded “M.M.’s testimony regarding an
incident that she disputes or does not remember took place when she was eleven years
old on a school bus would have added little with respect to evaluating B.H.’s credibility.”
Id.
In light of the Superior Court’s reasoning, it cannot be said its prejudice
determination was objectively unreasonable, or that it could not be reasonably justified
under Strickland. Accordingly, we will affirm.
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